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The Role of Religious Institutions
Hervé Maupeu
“The Bible furnishes Kenya’s shared national language
of politics as much as it feeds its several ethnic
imaginations. If Micere Mugo’s mother sang for her 
ethnic folktales, the Bible is a national store house of
folktales. They may be told in different vernaculars but
they are still the same stories. And it shows in everyday
Kenyan culture.” J. Lonsdale, ‘Religion and Politics
in Kenya.’ Cambridge, The Henry Martyn Lectures
2005.
1 Like  elsewhere  in  Africa,  the  Kenyan  clergy  is  intimately  involved  in  politics.
Nevertheless, clergymen hardly ever try to join politics. In the 2007 general elections, a
popular leader of the Pentecostal movement, Bishop Pius Muiru, head of the Maximum
Miracle Ministries, ran in the presidential elections but did not attract a large following.
In the legislative elections, only two religious leaders were elected: Margaret Wanjiru
(Starehe MP), who leads the Jesus Is Alive Ministries (JIAM), a Pentecostal outfit based in
Nairobi and Rev. Mutava Musyimi (Gachoka MP), who was the NCCK (National Council of
Churches of Kenya) secretary-general. On the other hand, the two religious leaders who
were members of the previous parliament, Bishop Stephen Ondiek (member of a neo-
traditional church, Legio Maria) and Pastor Akaranga, lost their seats.
2 Leading political  parties can nominate parliamentarians.  Only the Orange Democratic
Movement (ODM) nominated a religious leader, Sheikh Mohamed Dor (chairman of the
Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya), the first Imam to enter Parliament. The clergy
is therefore not over-represented in politics. Their influence is elsewhere. This influence
can be analyzed by examining religious pluralism in Kenya. The relationship between
politics and Islam in Kenya alongside the neo-traditional movements is conditioned by
the consanguinity  between Christianity  and the  colonial.  This  is  followed by a  post ‐
colonial State, which gives rise to an ambiguity of intimacy, collaboration, competition
and  a  contradictory  vision  of  social  organization  between  Christian  and  politicians.
During the colonial era,  the State systematically used Christian missions to penetrate
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communities  and  to  legitimize  itself.  This  relationship  between  politics  and
administration, on the one hand, and religion, on the other, was marked by frequent
tension. However, the faithful have over the years seen proximity and complementary
between the two. After independence, religious and State-controlled structures continued
to work together  in  several  projects  on the  ground.  Moreover,  they share  the  same
development-oriented nation-building ideology through development.  Thus,  when the
former Catholic bishop of Machakos, Bishop Kioko, died recently, journalists highlighted
the fact that he was “a churchman keen on development issues,” who built a hospital and a
leading secondary school in the area, not forgetting several projects run by the Diocesan
Development Office. Statement after statement by politicians stressed the leadership role
played by the late bishop in the diocese. In a country where religious metaphors deeply
permeate common parlance1, it is significant that they all used this term, which is linked
to  politics,  rather  than  the  term “shepherd,”  which  is  more  closely  associated  with
religion.
3 The Christian clergy and politicians share common political ideologies and they also work
together. However, this does not sufficiently explain the clergy’s involvement in national
politics. From John Lonsdale’s point of view, this interest stems from theological reasons:
“Kenyan political theology, a local version (some would call it a local subversion) of liberation
theory,  has  created  a  cyclic  tendency  in  the  State  cult.”2 This  outstanding analyst  of  the
Kenyan political culture is right in asserting that religious leaders have a fascination with
the  State.  Indeed,  leaders  of  Christian  organizations  are  currently  experiencing  the
negative effects of one of these cycles where the clergy has difficulty clearly positioning
themselves  in relation to political  leaders  and politicians in general.  To analyze this
dynamic, churches will be considered as actors involved in the political game. It does not
mean they are political actors like others but they are elements of political competition
where there are winners and losers, even though it is not always easy to distinguish the
gains from the losses.
4 Since the return of multiparty politics, the 2007 General Elections are the only ones in
which religious institutions have been most discreet or the least decisive about. Election
after  election,  religious  actors  appear  increasingly  marginalized.  It  can  be  said  that
Kenyan politics is getting in step with its constitution, which envisages a structure of an
officially secular State. But what would be the sense of divorcing religion from electoral
practices? Does it mean politicians have distanced themselves from the religious elite or
at least become independent? Are Kenyans now denying their clergy the political role
that they have played over the years? Are religious institutions ready to return to Caesar
what belongs to him?
5 Contrary to the improbable hypothesis of separating religion from politics, it is important
to understand the development of the political role Churches played within the confusion
the Kibaki regime put on religious actors’ perception of Kenyan politics. Under President
Moi’s regime, political divisions were clear-cut. Moral authority was clearly held by the
opposition and despite unacceptable practices most of the clergy debated the modalities
of  negotiating with a legitimately-elected government with whom they had to work,
regardless of disagreements. The Kibaki era blurred these boundaries.
6 Indeed, the 2002 political transition was achieved due to active support from the most
influential churches. Once in power, the new ruling elite worked with the clergy. There
was  nothing  surprising  about  that  since  a  large  part  of  public  services,  particularly
education  and  health,  were  managed  by  religious  organizations.  This  collaboration
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became more intimate than before because churches tended to initially legitimize the
new government they had endorsed, and in which they had big hopes.  However,  the
National  Rainbow  Coalition  (NARC)  split  soon  after  winning  elections.  Even  though
churches did not intend to choose between the two camps, thereby losing touch with the
majority,  their  stand was never clearly visible.  Indeed,  the main religious structures,
which are the most involved in public services, continued to work with the ruling class
and  appeared  to  endorse  the  Kibaki camp.  As  the  stakes  increased  and  the  polls
approached (the 2005 referendum followed the 2007 general elections), this trend became
more apparent. What needs to be established is whether this trend was deep-rooted or
simply about comments on sensitive matters. Thus, in 2007, like in previous elections,
churches seemed to have taken sides.  Their  rhetoric  about neutrality and respect  of
human rights,  at  least  at  diocese level,  was  like  grapevine leaves  that  cannot  orient
growth towards light.
7 After the 2007 elections, the Kibaki government and later the Odinga faction engaged in
political activities that could hardly be considered Christian. But how could they criticize
or denounce a group which they had previously supported? Was it even possible to say
they were playing the referee or could be assumed to be neutral in negotiations aimed at
resolving the crisis? It quickly became apparent that the clergy were not credible in the
new  role  the  incumbent  sought  to  have  them play.  And  what  influence  could  they
exercise  over  politicians  who  seemed  irresponsible?  The  churches  therefore  had  to
reinvent  their  political  role,  especially  because  the  faithful  had  clear  and  real
expectations. After the elections the number of churchgoers reduced even further. Thus,
religious institutions currently find themselves at a crossroads, grappling with issues and
difficulties not experienced by human rights NGOs. Indeed, like the clergy, members of
the bar in these NGOs,  who contributed to the 2002 victory,  often find it  difficult  to
denounce erstwhile friends. Moreover, some human rights organizations had difficulty
avoiding  radical  ethnicity  in  politics.3 Throughout  the  1990s,  Kenya  was apparently
endowed with a strong civil society which offered a viable alternative agenda. Is this still
the case at a time when this country is in dire need of a unifying factor, a social contract
and respect for human rights?
8 The Kenyan national political ethos is, above all, Christian and the other religions are
more often than not marginalized. However, the 2007 election campaigns were deeply
marked by actions and themes of a neo-traditional movement, Mungiki. Following the
elections, this sect became one of the big actors in violence. In fact, most analysts only see
militias in Mungiki youth. However, by ignoring its religious nature, it would be difficult
to understand Mungiki’s demands and the extent of its actions. Islam is also a religion
whose political influence becomes evident during elections. Indeed, for politicians out to
woo majorities, Muslim populations become particularly important communities.
 
Muslim population mostly in support of the opposition
9 During  elections,  the  “useful”  parts  of  Kenya  (over  1300  metres  above  sea  level)
rediscovers its peripheries, areas that are often Muslim. The Coast, in particular, seems to
be the province to woo by those with presidential ambitions.4 In fact, Muslim faithful
have traditionally voted for the presidential candidate who went on to win the elections…
except in 2007, if the official results are anything to go by.
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10 Throughout the election campaigns, political leaders spent long periods of time in the big
towns along the Coast. The two main coalitions, ODM and Party of National Unity (PNU),
demonstrated  their  influence  and  support  in  the  region  by  holding  massive  rallies.
Nevertheless,  it  soon  appeared  that  government  forces  had  difficulty  in  convincing
voters. In August 2007, President Kibaki set aside one week to traverse the whole region.
But speeches by pro-government figures were either lukewarm or highly critical. Even
ministers  from  the  region  publicly  stated  that  voters  needed  strong  signals  to  be
convinced by the incumbent.5
11 The watu wa pwani (Coastal people) stopped supporting the government for two main
reasons. The Mijikenda and other African communities blamed the government over its
land policies. Their community land or their right to land had been increasingly violated
by environmental legislation on forests. Land speculation and corruption in particular,
deprived them of the most productive areas. Squatters on public land had for several
generations  been  demanding  title  deeds  or  recognition  of  their  occupation.  During
elections,  all  politicians  made pledges  and Kibaki  did this  in  2002.  Not  content  with
forgetting  their  campaign  pledges,  those  close  to  the  head  of  state  evicted  people
occupying several  public  parcels  of  land near Mombasa and Malindi  and sub-divided
them.
12 A second source of tension drove coastal  residents to the opposition. Like other East
African  countries,  Kenya  adopted  an  anti-terrorist  legislation  linked  to  the  post-
September  11  attacks.  Like  elsewhere,  this  legislation  enabled  the  police  to  justify
practices  that  particularly  violated human rights.  Many youths  belonging to  Muslim
organizations were arrested and handed over to American forces.6 Several suspects of
Somali origin found themselves denouncing their Kenyan nationality. This miscarriage of
justice involved scores of  people but Muslims of Arabic or Somali  origin felt  directly
targeted. In particular, these practices reactivated a two-fold feeling of citizenship. For a
lot  of  Muslims,  it  was  difficult  to  get  identity  cards  or  passports.  And most  coastal
residents  thought the  state  did  not  invest  in  their  region  to  the  level  of  their
expectations.  It  is  true  that  major  infrastructure  in  the  region  (roads,  water,  and
electricity) as well as public services (health, education, domestic waste management…)
were far from satisfactory.
13 Faced  with  these  accumulated  frustrations,  the  ruling  class  resorted  to  quick  fix
solutions. A commission was set up to study the implementation of the anti-terrorist law
and  to  propose  solutions  that  would  ensure  the  Muslims  do  not  feel  discriminated
against.7 Idd Ul Fitr, the day that marks the end of Ramadan, became the 13 th holiday
recognized by the Kenyan Government.8 To address issues of Muslims living in Kibera, an
area within Odinga’s constituency, Kibaki officially declared Nubians one of the country’s
ethnic groups. All these announcements did not translate into a reversal of plummeting
state  popularity.  The  Kibaki  government  then resorted  to  denouncing  an agreement
(Memorandum of  Understanding)  the ODM signed with Namlef  (the National  Muslim
Leaders  Forum),  saying  it  would  divide  the  country  along  religious  lines.9 This
controversy mainly aimed to stimulate factionalism within the Muslim community, which
has always had difficulty protecting its façade of unity. Even though the Muslims seem to
vote  as  a  relatively  homogeneous  bloc,  they  remain  split  sociologically  between
communities  (Mijikenda,  Bajuni,  Somali,  inside  Muslims.),  which  are  only  partly
homogenized by the Swahili culture. Representative Muslim organizations do not share
the same views and the ruling class easily managed to mobilize them against each other.10
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14 Controversy over the agreement between ODM and Muslim organizations also sought to
draw churches into the debate to the government’s advantage. Catholic and Anglican
leadership particularly denounced the MoU. Nevertheless, the Anglican Church denied
rumours linking it to the dissemination of copies of the MoU.11 Many positions expressed
by  Christian  institutions  were  perceived  by  many  Muslim  leaders  to  reiterate  their
position as second fiddle in the life of a country that considers itself first and foremost
Christian.
15 The election results from the Coast were clear. Out of 21 seats, the PNU only won three
compared  to  ODM’s  12.  The  opposition  convinced  voters  by  pledging  high-level
decentralization  (majimbo)  which  bordered  on  federalism—R.  Odinga  managed  to
convince voters about his willingness to initiate a “Marshall Plan” to correct economic
retardation in the Coast—through the establishment of a free trade area in the port of
Mombasa. On the other hand, the Shirikisho Party of Kenya, which represented political
interests of the Mijikenda, remained in the government coalition for too long. One month
before the elections, some of its leaders said the party had withdrawn from the PNU, the
coalition under whose banner Kibaki was seeking re-election. But their move came too
late. Voters no longer wanted to be associated to the establishment. Shirikisho did not
win any parliamentary seat, thus signing its death warrant, according to some analysts.
16 In North-Eastern Province, the PNU Waterloo was less clear than it appeared. Out of 10
seats,  ODM  won  five.  The  Kenya  African  National  Union  (KANU)  demonstrated  its
influence in this region by retaining four parliamentary seats. President Moi’s networks
were still at work and the fortunes of the Kenyatta family, which controlled the party,
presumably  enhanced  this  fidelity.  The  tenth  constituency  was  taken  by  Abdikadir
Hussein Mohamed, who ran on a Safina ticket. Half of the region’s parliamentarians are
therefore close to the Kikuyu leaders’ spheres of influence though they do not necessarily
belong to M. Kibaki’s PNU.
17 Shortly after the election results were announced, there was tension in Mombasa. Like
other towns that largely voted for the opposition, groups of youths, Luo against Kikuyu,
clashed.  These clashes led to only a few deaths and the police were not as viciously
aggressive as they were in Kisumu. Moreover, Muslim organizations mobilized to calm
down groups that  were likely to engage in clashes.  However,  the situation remained
particularly tense by the end of February 2008.12
18 Election  campaigns  were  largely  peaceful,  except  in  urban  areas.  In  the  rest  of  the
country, many tension zones emerged in the very places where ethnic cleansing had been
experienced during the 1992 and 1997 elections. Analysts expressed fears of a repeat of
the Likoni massacres, which had led to a bloodbath in the south of Mombasa in 1992 and,
especially in 1997. ICG analysts expressed the view that the memory of police repression
had left Digo leaders too permanently paralyzed to entertain any thoughts of violence.
IRIN journalists13 viewed it differently. They particularly alluded to what they called the
“Mulungunipa Forest Group”14, a militia group linked to a minister, which the police came
across  undergoing  training  (in  June 2007).  Apparently,  the  political  leader  IRIN
mentioned  was  the  former  Likoni  MP  and  minister  of  national  heritance  during  M.
Kibaki’s  first  term  in  office,  Rashid  Suleiman  Shakombo.  His  name  had  often  been
mentioned in the commission of inquiry set up to investigate the Likoni massacres (refer
to the Akiwumi Report). In 2007, he was not re-elected and he accused his opponents of
having bewitched15 him. Some think that despite his age (over 75), he had not given up his
political ambitions. Moreover, leaders who are keen to mobilize violence can comfortably
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pay former soldiers in such a region where arms smuggling is rampant, particularly from
Somalia. On the other hand, the use of neo-traditional symbols and rituals, like in 1997,
was more difficult since the infamous religious leaders, who had endorsed violence, were
dead.
19 Finally, Muslim organizations came out of the post-2007 elections crisis relatively more
strengthened in their political role. They demonstrated their capacity to influence the
vote of their faithful. They controlled groups of youth which were ever ready to fight for
a variety of causes. Thus, the streets of Mombasa did not experience the kind of violence
linked with the emergence of the Islamic Party of Kenya16 in the 1990s. Muslim leaders
managed  to  control  their  flock.  On  the  other  hand,  the  political  direction  taken  by
churches seemed to be headed for troubled waters.
 
Politically disoriented churches
20 During election campaigns, churches seemed particularly partial and did not behave like
referees during the crisis. The prelates seemed too close to the political elite and not
powerful enough to influence them. Thus, Christian organizations proved to be secondary
actors  in  the  political  conflict.  However,  faced with the  disaster,  they  did  not bring
themselves into disrepute like had happened in Rwanda. During the ethnic cleansing in
the 1990s, they received internally displaced persons while the State appeared unable to
act.17 The churches did not stop working with and within communities. Their political
messages, at least at the national level, did not always seem discernible but they never
lost contact with the people, nor did they lose confidence, which cannot be said of State
leadership.
21 The Catholic Church was certainly the biggest loser in the political reconstitution. Close
to a quarter of the Kenyan populace is Catholic, making the church the largest religious
organization  in  the  country.  Since  independence,  it  benefited  from  colonial  land
allocation to missions, which were not expected to compete but to homogeneously spread
Western  civilization throughout  Kenya.  In  the  1960s  and 1970s,  the  Catholic  Church
developed structures in many regions where it had been present. But for a long time it
maintained the image of an organization that had been barely localized. This reputation
was evident in the nationality of its missionaries (mostly Italian, Irish and American)
during the colonial era and the large number of white priests working in the country
after  independence.  So,  until  the  1980s,  Catholics  remained  discreet  over  national
debates. The church’s political behaviour changed with the return of multiparty politics.
Together with mainstream Protestant churches, it agitated for the multiparty system. Its
politicization radicalized with the first ethnic cleansing between 1992 and 1993. In fact,
Catholic  parishes  played  a  major  role  in  receiving  tens  of  thousands  of  internally
displaced persons whose existence the State was trying to deny. The top echelons of the
church was at the time very open to the theology of liberation and its major official
statements on the political situation were written by Father Mejia, a Colombian Jesuit
who became the regional head for East Africa towards the end of the 1990s. The prelate
was at the time living within a community in the Kangemi area (Nairobi) where he noted
first hand the degeneration of public services in Nairobi slums. As the regime became
more and more authoritarian, public services disappeared in most parts of the city and
State  presence  shrunk  in  governance  functions  under  the  pressure  of  structural
adjustment programs.
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22 Throughout the 1990s, the Catholic Church leadership supported various initiatives to
demand constitutional reforms. This was clearly in support of a democratic opposition,
committed to defending human rights18 and which offered an alternative to the Moi
regime. However, from 1992, Kibaki, a Catholic, seemed to be their favourite candidate.
Its  moderate  and conservative  stance  were  perceived as  guarantees  against  excesses
feared  to  be  the  hallmark  of  a  ruling  class  that  had  difficulties  in  converting  to
democratic  values.  The  top  clergy  knew the  political  elite  very  well  and  harboured
distrust for its motivation and capacity. It therefore advocated for reduced powers of a
Government that was increasingly absent.
23 Support for Kibaki from the Catholic leadership was nationwide. But today, this support is
limited and conditional and is perceived to come from an ethnicized or even Kikuyu
organization. However, the Catholic Church’s political influence stems from its national
reach. Apart from the Anglican Church, the Catholic Church is the only other religious
organization with a presence throughout the country. However, the Anglican Church of
Kenya operates  more  like  a  federation of  dioceses  that  correspond closely  to  ethnic
groups, which they have sometimes contributed to inventing, while the Catholic Church
is a centralized bureaucracy. The Catholic Church is a structure of 24 dioceses distributed
within four provinces: Nairobi (2,669,000 members), Kisumu (2,582,000), Nyeri (2,446,000)
and Mombasa (225,000).  Most priests work in the parishes often situated in different
dioceses or regions.
24 Why did the Catholic  Church appear particularly partial  and specifically  support  the
president after the 2007 elections despite the contested election results? This perception
is less linked to its position in 2008 than to a dynamic that has been in place for a longer
time. First, the 2002 political victory was felt to be closely associated with the Kikuyu
clergy. In Central Province, the primary elections to nominate NARC candidates were held
in parishes and were presided over by priests. It is true that the Catholic Church was the
largest religious force in the region: in Nyeri District 41.21% of the population is Catholic.
19 Like in 1997, the clergy endorsed M. Kibaki and members of his coalition. In no other
region  did  the  Catholic  Church  appear  as  involved  in  election  campaigns.  This
commitment  was  not  only  related  to  the  fact  that  M.  Kibaki  was  an  eminent
representative of Nyeri and that many politicians from the region were Catholics. The
clergy were also very involved in contemporary debates about Kikuyu ethnicity. Most
publications in the Kikuyu language came from the Catholic printing press and the main
intellectuals, thinkers on ethnic nationalism were Catholic. They were thus at the heart of
reflections on what to expect of leaders. Their analyses were often critical but this did not
stop them from actively supporting M. Kibaki. Local vicars were often vectors of rare
social mobilization. This was the case in Thika at the beginning of the 1990s when slum
residents demonstrated against pollution from industries and working conditions. Ten
years  later,  a  dispute  involving  coffee  cooperatives  received  religious  support.  The
Murang’a Catholic diocese newsletter, Mwihoko, was banned several times and reputed to
be quite controversial both politically (during the Moi era) and socially (especially against
multinationals). The clergy was therefore a very active socio-pluralist force and in local
politics.
25 The Catholic Church was thus a champion of Kikuyu ethnicity and the clergy had an
indisputable prescriptive power in Central  Province.  There is  no such comparison in
western Kenya, where Catholics represent less than a quarter of the population and are
just  one  religious  force  among  others.  Their  ties  with  the  elite  are  a  lot  harder  to
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pinpoint. Nevertheless, the church considers itself influential in the whole country and
some prelates comment on important election campaign issues. Thus, Cardinal Njue, the
Kenyan archbishop and former Nyeri  bishop opposed the majimbo (decentralization)
system, which was the cornerstone of the opposition’s campaign agenda. The Catholic
clergy from western Kenya, Odinga’s stronghold, began to receive threats and announced
that Cardinal Njue had expressed his own views and not the views of the church.
26 After the elections, the Catholic Church leadership held partisan positions. They called
upon the two camps to talk and to share power. They supported all negotiations without
trying to interfere. In the dioceses affected by violence, bishops courageously denounced
those  involved.  Like  in  the  1990s,  Catholic  parishes  received  a  number  of  displaced
families. Nevertheless, the image of the church deteriorated because it was no longer
considered an entity above ethnicity that could speak in the interest of everyone. This
partly explains why its messages were ignored. This is the point of view expressed by
Musambayi Katumanga, a political scientist from the University of Nairobi, who explained
in an interview with the National Catholic Reporter (25 January 2008) that “the churches
were silent when we really needed them. We are harsher with our church leaders because they are
the ones who are supposed to stick their neck out one questions of justice and honesty. That is their
mission, and they have failed us.”
27 The  Protestant  churches  came  out  of  the  crisis  less  weakened  politically  than  the
Catholics  because  the  expectations  on  them  were  fewer.  They  disappointed  many
supporters but their self-criticism was harsher than that of the Catholics.  During the
election  campaigns,  leaders  of  churches  created  by  colonial  missionaries  expressed
themselves  politically  along  ethnic  lines  even  though  national  structures  called  for
political neutrality and respect for democratic rules (rejection of vote-buying, rejection of
election violence.). These religious organizations unanimously supported the PNU while
the evangelical  and Pentecostal  churches  supported the ODM camp.  They sometimes
aligned themselves with Musyoka,  who often presented himself  as “saved.” After the
vote,  churches  avoided  partisan  rhetoric  with  the  exception  of  some  Methodist  and
Presbyterian leaders who endorsed the head of  state’s  re-election without consulting
others.  Members  of  the  NCCK  embarked  on  a  repentance  exercise  (the  “journey  of
repentance”  led  by  the  organization  Secretary-General,  Rev.  Peter  Karanja).20 They
stressed that their credibility had been terribly soiled by the crisis Kenya experienced.
True to staunch Protestant principles, they criticized themselves publicly while Catholics
remained silent on the topic, even though the blogs run by the clergy (particularly those
hosted by expatriates) showed their concerns.  The nature of the debate also differed
between the two Christian denominations. Whereas Protestants speak of principles and
morals, Catholics had a more technocratic approach: they sought bureaucratic solutions
to avoid getting their structure entangled in partisan positions that could overwhelm
them. Thus, some bloggers called for an end to dioceses based on ethnic boundaries. They
called for an end to posting of bishops to minister among their own ethnic communities.21
28 Christian organizations were taken by surprise by the post-election crisis. Their response
was  to  call  for  negotiations  and  to  receive  victims  of  massacres,  mostly  without
discrimination. They also engaged in a reflection exercise on their role in breeding the
causes of the disaster. Their part was actually quite minor. The conflict showed their
helplessness and their inability to influence politics. It is likely that in the short-term
their political voice will remain inaudible. This is not the case for Mungiki, contemporary
Kenya’s most infamous of the neo-traditional movements.
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The tough politicization of Mungiki
29 In 2002, Makau Mutua,  a Kenyan law professor in the State University of  New York,
dedicated two chapters (4 and 5) of his principal work22 to how differently the State and
human rights organizations treat the Holy Book religions and the African traditional
denominations.  Both  Christian  and  Muslim  proselytism  has  demonized  traditional
religions  and  imposed  the  idea  that  pre-colonial  cultures  were  not  well-adapted  to
modernity.  Both  the  colonial  and  the  post-colonial  State  had  a  hand  in  this
marginalization of African cultures.
In many African countries, there have been no national debates to evaluate and
contextualize African customs and laws within the modern state. Many traditional
practices,  from  polygamy  to  traditional  healing  and  worship,  which  were
discredited by the colonial state, are actively prohibited and punished by the new
African-led  governments.  In  this  process  of  continued  acculturation,  African
religions have been one of the major casualties of the culture of imitation (Mutua,
2002: 105).
30 Mutua, the multicultural activist, defends the idea of “moral equivalence of cultures” that
contemporary human rights must actively set in motion.
31 At no moment does M. Mutua allude to Mungiki. Yet Mungiki seems to be the main theme
of his two chapters. Kenyan readers familiar with his works associate his thoughts with
the risks presented by the sect, which M. Mutua knows very well. Indeed, he actively
participated  in  the  creation  and  the  development  of  the  Kenya  Human  Rights
Commission, and was one of the rare breed of lawyers who, towards the end of the Moi
era, dared to take on cases involving members of Mungiki, who faced persecution by the
ruling class which alternated arrests of members with political manipulation of the sect.
In the beginning of the new millennium, the KHRC no longer wanted to deal with cases of
young  supporters  of  this  neo-prophetic  group.  Release  Political  Prisoners,  a  much
politicized and ethnicized NGO (essentially a Kikuyu movement) took over. Members of
the KHRC shunned the Mungiki cases because they were afraid of being used by a sect
that took advantage of  the courts to try to gain publicity for its  activities.  However,
Makau Mutua seems to politically disagree with this movement or at least he does not
appreciate their political strategies. But Mungiki offered him a chance to reflect on the
nature of the post-colonial State and the sense of crisis in this superstructure. According
to him, “the modern African State, right from its inception, has at best, relentlessly engaged in a
campaign of marginalization, and at worst, eradicated African religion” (p. 112). It has caused “
identity disorientation” (p. 114), which explains in a deeper sense the post-colonial State’s
failure to adapt because it forgets or simply casts away its memory, and is set according
to Eurocentric norms and values. Even though he refuses to talk of Mungiki, M. Mutua
implicitly  provides  an analytical  framework for  the  sect’s  political  situation and the
reactions it elicits. However, Mungiki was at the heart of the 2007 election campaigns (not
only  in  Central  Province)  and occupied a  very  special  position.  Both the  media  and
politicians spoke of violence and the movement’s practices,  without dealing with the
sense or  the political  message conveyed by these  actions.  Sanctions  against  Mungiki
obscured its politicization. The elites refused to accept Mungiki’s presence in the public
space and in the same vein denied the relevance of social issues that the sect dramatically
raised. However, since the first post-electoral violence, the ruling class has again woken
up to the social reality that Mungiki has been exposing to them and which they rejected.
The Role of Religious Institutions
Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review, 38 | 2008
9
At certain times of  the crisis,  it  became difficult to deny deep-rooted movements in
society.
32 Mungiki has made headlines in newspapers for the last ten years or so and researchers in
social studies have come up with many analyses on this movement. Two trends have
followed each other.  Towards the end of the 1990s,  Mungiki captured the interest of
specialists on religion.23 Protestant organizations (NCCK) financed major research aimed
at appreciating the extent of  this  phenomenon.  After the wave of  American-inspired
Pentecostal  movement,  Protestant  churches  feared  the  success  of  neo-traditionalists.
Thus, Mungiki captured their attention at a time when intense rumours circulated on
devil worship entirely taking over social life in the Mount Kenya region. Devil worship
was perceived as a contemporary form of ancient witchcraft from which many Kenyans,
and in this case the Kikuyu, tried to protect themselves.  In the face of this concern,
mainstream  Protestant  churches  felt  disadvantaged  and  were  incapable  of  finding
practical  answers  when  the Pentecostal  movement  and  neo-traditionalists  took  full
advantage of the faithful’s fears. Thus, sociologists commissioned to study Mungiki took
interest in the sect’s background. They showed that it arose from of the widespread wave
of prophetism that tends to be on the rise whenever the Kikuyu community considers
itself in serious crisis and that it expects explanations to what it is experiencing. They
also  underscored  the  Mau  Mau  heritage  on  which  Mungiki  blossomed.  Indeed,  the
contemporary sect portrays itself as having direct links with the movement of the 1950s
from which it has borrowed its objectives, methods and rituals.
33 25 Since 2000, this religious sociology approach gave way to a more minimalist vision
which from a social science perspective, denies the media doxanalysis. The majority of
politicians and mostly the Kenyan middle class are frightened by this violent order to
supposedly return to its roots, which the movement is carrying out effectively.24 Mungiki
is therefore exclusively perceived as a federation of groups of bloodthirsty youth: “Apart
from running extortion rings largely targeting the matatu industry, the Mungiki kill in the most
gruesome manner, usually by beheading their victims.”25 These analysts portray Mungiki as a
more successful militia than others. However, by only looking at this aspect of Mungiki
activities,  they  cannot  find  any  explanation  for  the  movement’s  unique  success.
Obviously,  it  is  difficult  to  understand Mungiki  without  looking at  the  group in  the
context of a larger dynamic of privatization of violence, State withdrawal from a whole
range of  governance functions and take-over of  security by communities themselves.
Nevertheless, this movement is not only a militia group which extorts money wherever it
operates. If Mungiki is simply a mafia, why then did the ruling class engage in a vendetta
war against the group in 2007? 26
34 Indeed, State leadership largely contributed to the focus of the 2007 election campaign on
Mungiki. Their attempt to gag the sect politically failed and backfired on them. In the
beginning of year, the family of the sect’s founder announced that their organization
would sponsor candidates in all Kikuyu constituencies. In 2002, Mungiki made similar
statements.  At  the  time,  politicians  had  effectively  contained  politicization of  the
movement. Why did the ruling class opt to engage the Njenga family in an open war five
years down the line? It probably stemmed from the contents of a press conference that
the  media  paid  little  attention  to.  Maina  Njenga,  the  son  of  the  Mungiki  leader,
announced that he was interested in one of Laikipia’s two constituencies, his family’s
home town. However, the Kikuyu population in Laikipia is mostly from Nyeri District and
the town’s economic and political elite consider this part of the Rift Valley as an annex of
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their  region.  Thus,  Kibaki  considers  Laikipia  as  part  of  his  Nyeri  stronghold.  It  was
significant that in 1997, when he challenged the election results, the ruling class at the
time  triggered  off  ethnic  cleansing  in  these  two  constituencies.  The  message  was
understood and Kibaki withdrew his petition. In 2007, the election results seemed too
close and the President wanted to secure all the Kikuyu constituencies. Consequently,
Laikipia West was taken by Ndirithu Muriithi, the head of state’s nephew and brother to
Kibaki’s main spin doctor in the 1992, 1997 and 2002 election campaigns. The Njenga
family therefore presented a threat to the interests of Kibaki’s immediate family. This
challenge was even more intolerable because the new candidate was not a politician and
therefore faced great odds in winning the election. The reaction was fast: Maina Njenga
was arrested together with his cousin for being in possession of weapons and consuming
drugs (hashish). The judges sentenced Njenga to five years in jail and released Joseph
Kimani Ruo. Apparently, the police rearrested the former, which they denied. He has
since been reported killed. This case triggered off response strategies by Mungiki, which
staged targeted attacks in constituencies represented by M. Kibaki’s close allies.  They
especially targeted politicians with whom they had worked and who would have betrayed
them (at least this is the consideration of Mungiki leaders). Thus, they concentrated on
ruining  the  reputation  of  the  two  ministers  of  internal  security  under  Kibaki,  C.
Murungaru  and  especially  John  Michuki.  To  hit  the  latter,  Mungiki’s  destabilization
methods  took  various  forms:  murder  of  local  administrators  in  the  minister’s
constituency,  financing  an  opponent,  threatening  the  bus  service  controlled  by  the
politician’s son, destruction of coffee plantations and assaulting patrons of the country
club he owns near Nairobi.  But the Kikuyu elite showed some paranoia and all  risks
suffered by J. Michuki’s businesses were probably blamed unfairly on Mungiki.
35 The sect  did not  concentrate  its  violence exclusively on political  targets.  During the
second quarter of 2007, in particular, it carried out several murders in the outskirts of
Nairobi (Kiambu, Banana Hill), apparently to frighten supporters who attempted to jump
ship in the face of mounting police persecution. Indeed, a new squad called Kwekwe was
set up to specifically fight against Mungiki. Enjoying absolute immunity, it engaged in
massacres.  Human rights organizations estimate that  close to 500 youths were killed
between June and July.27 During the entire summer, bodies were often recovered in the
virtually-deserted precincts  of  the Nairobi  National  Park and in the rivers  of  Kamba
districts.  The  security  forces  arrested  very  many  lower-class  ordinary  Kenyans  only
because they were Kikuyu, poor and young. This was on the suspicion that they were
possibly Mungiki  adherents.  The persecutions were particularly virulent  in Michuki’s
constituency,  where,  for  several  weeks,  young  men  opted  to  flee  and  seek  shelter
elsewhere in order to avoid police harassment.
36 Tension between Mungiki and the State leadership can be interpreted as a consequence of
the wounded pride of senior authorities. Besides, this crisis, like the Mau Mau conflict, is
some sort of civil war among the Kikuyu. In fact, sections of the Mount Kenya populations
read the confrontation between Mungiki and the State as a continuity of the violence that
pitted  loyalists  against  the  Mau  Mau  in  the  1950s.  Thus,  J.  Michuki  managed  with
difficulty to clear himself of accusations over his loyalist past. M. Kibaki himself made a
lot of effort not to be bundled together with loyalists. Since his ascent to power, he has
honoured the memory of Mau Mau heroes. There was even a disastrous tour in 2003,
when a pompous welcome was organized for an Ethiopian peasant presented as General
Mathenge, who was said to have taken refuge in the neighbouring country. The results of
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DNA tests on the Ethiopian were released four years later.28 The President also promised
to find the bones of Dedan Kimathi, the most famous Mau Mau leader. This is another
failure that the regime attempted to erase from people’s memory by installing a bronze
statue of the hero in central Nairobi.
37 These efforts were hardly convincing because the Kibaki government had a policy that
was radically  hostile  to Mau Mau ideals  whereas Mungiki  seemed to be a  legacy (or
offshoots)  of  the  movement  of  the  1950s  (even  though  former  freedom  fighters’
associations contested this). Indeed, the sect, like the Mau Mau bush fighters, denounced
all social obstacles that impeded achievement among young Kikuyu. However, the State is
at  the  centre  of  an  economic  system  in  which  the  youth  cannot  obtain  salaried
employment,  largely  reserved  for  the  older  generation.  Even  young  graduates  have
difficulty getting employed whereas there has been economic growth since 2003. They
have gained nothing from an improved economic situation that has brought no hope to
the  most  populous  age  groups  in  the  country.  They  hence  find  themselves  being
approached for jobs as militias. It is the return of warrior ideals which makes violence the
only hope of success for many young people. It creates conditions which are more prone
to eruption of violence than factors of low life expectancy (at less than fifty years), which
has considerably reduced the window of opportunity within which the youth can achieve
(by starting a family based on sufficient income).
38 The State had no solution to this infernal equation (Malthusian economy + age groups
before demographic transition + privatization of security), apart from the spectacle of
widespread high-level corruption (Goldenberg scandal during the Moi era and the scandal
of Anglo-Leasing companies during the Kibaki era), from which certain people benefit
more than others.  In this context,  Christian morality and democratic values officially
defended by all public personalities appear to be double-speak that gives little hope. The
thought that the Mungiki message is yet to see better days is justifiable. The post-2007
crisis clearly demonstrated this.
39 Right from the initial violence that followed the announcement of official election results,
Mungiki  factions  participated  in  ethnic  cleansing  that  affected  some  parts  of  the
sprawling Mathare Valley slums. In towns situated in Kikuyuland and Kikuyu-dominated
towns in the Rift Valley (Nakuru, Naivasha, Nyahururu), Mungiki cells were reactivated.
They administered oaths more and more openly and the police were asked to turn a blind
eye. During the month of January, the sect remained rather discreet and many journalists
thought  that  the  summer  massacres  had  completely  disorganized  Mungiki.  But  the
second wave of violence in the Rift Valley discredited this analysis. Both in Nakuru and
Naivasha many gangs of youth, some proclaiming their membership to the sect, carried
out massacres of non-Kikuyu residents.  They terrorized passengers on all  roads from
Nairobi to western Kenya.
40 This second wave of murderous fever was linked to the risks of ODM—PNU negotiations.
State  leadership  wished  to  procrastinate  and  prolong  the  discussions  for  as  long  as
possible while Western powers resorted to pressure and threats to force negotiators to
reach a compromise. Some quarters close to the leadership perhaps funded or at least
capitalized on the violence, which erupted very conveniently, to push their strategy. But
Mungiki took advantage of this respite or prompt cooperation. Thus, in early March, the
movement, under the banner of Kenya National Youth Alliance organized a protest march
in downtown Nairobi bringing together several thousands of people. The demonstrators
demanded the release of their leader Maina Njenga with slogans like “No Maina No Peace.”
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The police allowed the demonstrations to continue but announced the following day that
a new, specialized police force to fight Mungiki would be created. It would replace the
Kwekwe squad that had been disbanded in January 2008.29 The mission of this police force
was difficult to define as the leadership still needed the services of Mungiki. But the sect
was not always going to allow itself to be used and to be denied space in public life.
41 The analysis of Mungiki’s political behaviour during the election period tends to consider
this group as a political actor like any other. Taking its religious dimension into account
makes it possible to qualify the image that attempts have been made to improve. First,
Mungiki  participates from a largely religious perspective where this  sphere is  subtly
separated from the political and socio-cultural space. In this sense, this group positions
itself at the centre of continuous production of the Kikuyu identity, notably to the level of
its political organization. Like other prophets, it must explain what is expected of leaders
in order to arrive at a certain understanding of society. Besides, and this is its originality
in the grey prophetic sphere. It also portrays itself as a participant of the group called
upon to govern. Indeed, Mungiki,  like other Kikuyu social groups, positioned itself to
welcome the election as Ituika, the moment where in the pre-colonial Kikuyu society, the
generation in power (political and religious) handed over to a younger generation.30 In
this view, generations of social cadets must demand the exit of social elders. In the end,
the youth take over the community’s leadership after a ceremony of purification, making
a fresh start. Obviously Mungiki considers itself an embodiment of a fraction of the youth.
As can be seen during elections,  the period bears a strong meaning in the prophetic
conception of the world that the sect promotes.
42 From the end of the 1990s, the Njenga family spread this doctrine of Ituika election that
proves to be a rallying call among young adherents. But despite appearances that the sect
founders cleverly protect, this vision is challenged by sections within it. Indeed, one of
the reasons for the movement’s success is due to its means of communication which is
both modern and very controlled. Until 2002, Mungiki’s external relations were managed
by N.  Waruinge,  the founder’s highly-educated cousin with an impressive network of
acquaintances in the political  arena and in the media.  This expert in communication
managed to entrench the idea that  Mungiki  is  a  united mass  movement,  and whose
followers are organized in a firm hierarchy (with model that is almost military), with a
strong  mobilizing  or  even  revolutionary  capacity.  This  rhetoric  hardly  created  any
illusions and it transpired that some Mungiki groups enjoyed a high degree of autonomy.
This led to a distinction of the upcountry Mungiki, who operated differently from the
Mungiki in town. Ties and numerous occasions for rituals made them meet. Nevertheless,
it  was clear that Nairobi communities carried out their own (economic and political)
activities and the interviews seemed to indicate that they were hardly accountable to
anyone. Mungiki appeared like a federation of various groups, or like a trademark of an
identity  factory.  However,  during  the  elections,  the  Njenga  family  did  not  seem  to
stomach this situation any more and in 2007, sect members were murdered because they
wished to  leave  the  movement  which was  facing police  persecution.  These  murders,
whose aim was to instil more discipline in the ranks, were committed in accordance with
rituals (severed heads displayed on a post facing a certain direction.). These killings were
certainly necessary to ensure the fidelity to a religious movement which seemed to be
fragmenting.  Indeed,  all  research  findings  on  Kikuyu  prophetism  underscored  their
difficulties  to  institutionalize  and  to  limit  continuous  divisions.31 However,  the
contemporary  Kikuyu  prophetic  field  is  currently  dynamic  and  it  readily  offers
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alternatives to Mungiki’s  war and youth vision.  Thus,  the Akorino nebula proposes a
pacifist, apolitical religious practice and away from a world32 that can act as refuge when
Mungiki groups attempt to develop authoritarian oathing and conversion, which seems to
be the case since January 2008. So much so that the recent Mungiki resurgence, which has
apparently enjoyed high-level political patronage, was not unanimously embraced by sect
elite itself. Ben Rawlence33 thus thinks that the Njenga family was not directly involved in
the  post-election Mungiki  reprisals.  These  forces  were  essentially  manipulated by  N.
Waruinge.  Thus,  the  sect  found itself  increasingly  in  the news but  gradually  lost  its
religious legitimacy. Mungiki became a label designed to instil fear but this political use
of  myth and symbols  associated  with  the  movement  would  neither  dissipate  Kikuyu
prophetism nor political issues that this group so appropriately raised.
43 In  the  end,  religious  actors  were  only  very  secondary  actors  in  the  2007  election
campaigns and the crisis that followed the polls. This is probably regrettable because it
reveals a political system that is closed by politicians, who lack new ideas and prevent the
civil society (religious leaders) from genuinely engaging in the political processes. The
political negation of Mungiki or at least the issues that the sect raises, reveal a system
that ignores the majority of the people (the youth) and, in particular, the extremely poor
sections of the population. It is dangerous when the society extols the virtues of wealth at
the expense of principles of solidarity and social contract.
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NOTES
1. ‘The people’s bishop leaves a rich legacy.’ Daily Nation, 5 March 2008.
2. J. Lonsdale, 2005, p. 4.
3. Thus, three months after the crisis began, reports by government structures and the
Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) are yet to be released. However, change of heart by
some intellectuals (notably Prof. Kibwana) during the Kibaki era raises suspicion among
analysts.
4. In reality, Coast Province is a melting pot for various communities where Christianity
and Islam are represented more or less equally. It is one of the regions with the highest
number of Muslim voters.
5. ‘Coast leaders draw up wish list for President,’ The Standard, 14 August 2007.
6. Isaac Ongiri, ‘Muslim lobbies take issue with Michuki’s deportation denial.’ The Standard
, 24 October 2007 ; ‘Ex-terror suspect’s case withdrawn.’ The Daily Nation, 27 October 2007;
Sunguta West ‘Political Repercussions of Somali Conflict Spread to Kenya.’ The Jamestown
Foundation, 7 November 2007, URL: https://jamestown.org/brief/political-repercussions-
of-somali-conflict-spread-to-kenya/ [archive]; ‘Scores arrested in terror Hunt.’ The Daily
Nation, 15 December 2007.
7. Isaac Ongiri, ‘Muslim lobbies take issue with Michuki’s deportation denial.’ The Standard
, 24 October 2007; ‘Muslim issues team picked.’ Daily Nation, 16 October 2007.
8. ‘Kibaki gives Muslims holiday.’ Daily Nation, 6 November 2007.
9. In  2002,  NARC,  led  by  M.  Kibaki,  signed  a  similar  agreement  with  organizations
representing Muslims. What was in the interest of the country in 2002 no longer seemed
to be five years later.
10. It is an old dynamic. For further reading, refer to F. Constantin, 1997.
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11. These rumours were aimed at discrediting R. Odinga, who is Anglican. During election
campaigns word went round that his church had excommunicated him and considered
him apostate.
12. International Crisis Group, Kenya in Crisis, ICG Africa Report no. 137, 21 February 2008,
p. 10.
13. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), ‘Kenya: Armed and dangerous.’ 22
February 2008.
14. Which is also mentioned in the ICG report.
15. ‘Minister blames loss on witchcraft.’ KTN report broadcast by YouTube.
16. Refer to A. Oded, 2000.
17. Even though the administration was more present on the ground than in the 1990s,
under the Moi era, the State covered up displacement of people. The media are now more
present and the international community continues to follow the situation.
18. Refer to H. Maupeu, 2004.
19. Official church statistics. Nyeri Province covers the whole of Mount Kenya region and
beyond. Its 7 dioceses are Nyeri, Embu, Maralal, Marsabit, Meru, Murang’a, Nyahururu.
20. ‘Church on a soul-searching journey.’ The Standard, 2 March, 2008.
21. John L. Allen Jr, ‘Church leaders faulted in Kenya.’ National Catholic Reporter, 25 January
2008; Catholic Information Service for Africa (Nairobi), ‘Catholic expert says Church is
guilty of fanning tribalism.’ Catholic Information Service for Africa (Nairobi) [archive], 29
February 2008.
22. M. Mutua, 2002.
23. G.N. Wamue, 2001.
24. D. Anderson 2002; P.M. Kagwanja, 2006; M. Katumanga, 2005; H. Maupeu, 2002a ; J.-C.
Servant, 2005.
25. ‘Mungiki storm city, stage demo.’ 6 March 2008.
26. This makes specialists to adopt a policist approach which is strongly balanced against
religious sociology analysis: P.M. Kagwanja, 2003; H. Maupeu, 2002b; H. Maupeu, 2003. For
more on the Mungiki doctrine, see H. Maupeu, 2007.
27. IRIN,  8  June  2007,  ‘Police  repression  against  the  Mungiki  sect  intensifies’;  Oscar
Foundation, Youth State Repression. The Killings Fields, Nairobi, 2007.
28. ‘Ethiopan Ayanu was not the Uhuru hero.’ The Standard, 18 October 2007.
29. ‘Mungiki storm city, stage demo.’ The Standard, 6 March 2008; ‘New squad formed to
crack down on Mungiki.’ The Standard, 7 March 2008.
30. On this subject, refer to H. Maupeu, 2003 and 2007.
31. Refer to Valeer Neckebrouck’s work, Le onzième commandement : étiologie d’une église
indépendante au pied du Mont Kenya (Immensee : Nouvelle revue de science missionnaire,
1978) and Le peuple affligé : les déterminants de la fissiparité dans un mouvement religieux au
Kenya central (Immensee : Nouvelle revue de science missionnaire, 1983).
32. On this subject, Barbara Morovich is an authority. Refer especially to Morovitch, B.,
2007. The Tent of the Living God is also a neo-traditional movement close to the Mungiki
wave.  Some  even  say  that  Mungiki  stemmed  from it.  This  group,  which  is  pacifist,
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survived the death of  its  founder,  Ngonya wa Gakonya and offers  an alternative  for
Mungiki adherents.
33. He prepared the Human Rights Watch report on the Kenyan crisis, Ballots to Bullets.
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